Jonathan Weisberg (2010) argues that, given the old datum that life exists, the new datum that the universe is fine-tuned for life does not confirm the design hypothesis. Thus, finetuning has nothing to do with it. I will argue that there is a design argument that survives Weisberg's critique; the fact that the universe is life-sustaining supports the design hypothesis, but it only does so given fine-tuning.
Weisberg argues that it would not be. A designer could have created a universe in which a broad range of constants sustained life, or a universe in which only a narrow range of constants sustains life. We have no reason to think one more likely than the other. Formally, P(N|D)> P(N|-D) says that a designer is more likely than a mindless process to create a universe in which only a narrow range of constants sustains life. But we have no reason to believe this. So we have no reason to accept the first sentence of the quotation above. I will grant Weisberg this point for the sake of argument. 4 Weisberg leaves it open whether a different fact supports D -namely the fact that the universe does have the right constants for life. Call this L. But if it is L that supports D, fine-tuning seems to have nothing to do with it! And this is puzzling, as it is the apparent degree of fine-tuning that has generated the recent interest in the argument. To take the extreme case first, suppose that any constants would sustain life. (Call this B for Broad). Then P(L|-D&B) = 1. Assuming that a designer would have ensured life existed, P(L|D& B) = 1. So P(L|D& B) = P(L|-D& B), and L would not confirm D.
4 White (forthcoming) convincingly responds to Weisberg's argument here. I argue that even if we grant Weisberg this point, there is still a fine-tuning argument which takes L as the new evidence. 5 There is no reason to think this objection limited to the cosmological fine-tuning argument as opposed to the traditional biological design argument. Weisberg doesn't extend his objection in this way, but I see no reason why he shouldn't.
Now suppose that only a narrow range of constants would generate life (N). If
there is no designer we would expect the probability of L to be less than 1; P(L|-D&N) < 1. Again assuming that a designer would have ensured life existed, P(L|D&N) = 1. So P(L|-D&N) < P(L|D&N), and L supports D. So L supports D only if it is not part of the background condition that all constants generate life. So some degree of fine-tuning is essential to the confirmation of D after all.
Generalizing the Response
The point can be generalized. Let's assume that we can model the values of constants as being fixed by a random process if there is no designer. Then we can show that the narrower the range of constants that allow life, the greater the degree of confirmation L gives D.
Let Cx =The fraction of settings on which the constants are capable of supporting life is x.
Thus P(L|-D& Cx) = x L supports D&Cx iff P(L|-D& Cx) < P(L|D& Cx), and the degree of confirmation increases with the size of the inequality. The size of the inequality is maximal if P(L|D& Cx) = 1 (i.e. a designer would ensure life exists), and P(L|-D& Cx) = x is vanishingly small. As x  1, and the range of life-supporting constants increases, the size of the inequality decreases. So the smaller the value of x, the narrower the life-supporting range, and the greater the degree of confirmation L gives D&Cx.
The assumption that an intelligent designer is guaranteed to create life can be weakened. P(L|-D& Cx) < P(L|D& Cx) merely requires that the probability that a designer would generate life is higher than the probability that a mindless universe would. And this is surely the intuition at the heart of the design argument.
This is not to say that the fine-tuning argument is succesful, 6 but I have argued that it can survive Weisberg's objection.
